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and 
Atul Sheel 
ABSTRACT 
Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) have emerged strong and 
have faced a generally positive credit environment since the last recession. As the 
market grew out of recession in the early 1990s, the primary focus remained on pro- 
viding better and safer returns to investors. Tied in their lock box, a period that con- 
tractually prohibits the borrower from all prepayments, the borrowers kept holding 
tightly onto their loans. Currently, as the delinquency rate on loans has been on the 
rise, and as the mortgage market offers refinancing opportunities at lower interest 
rates, more and more borrowers are looking to transfer or to refinance their loans. 
This paper examines commercial mortgage-backed securities and provides useful 
insights for borrowers to find their way out of CMBS loans. 
Fundamentals of Securitization 
The primary idea of securitization is to create certain instruments that can be placed 
in the market. One such application of the securitization technique is the creation of mar- 
ketable securities out of (or based on) receivables. The intention of such an application is 
to afford marketability to financial claims in the form of receivables. Per its textbook defi- 
nition, securitization of receivables is a process by which cash flows or claims against 
third parties of an entity, either existing or future, are identified, consolidated, separated 
from the originating entity, and then fragmented into 'securities' to be offered to inves- 
tors (Kothari, 2000). The involvement of a third party in such a receivable securitization 
process adds unique dimensions to the concept. There is no legal difficulty when an 
entity creates a claim on itself, but the scenario is completely different when rights on 
third parties are turned into a tradable commodity. Also, the process affords to the issuer 
the rare ability to originate an instrument that hinges on the quality of the underlying 
asset. Hence, it allows the issuer to make his or her own credit rating insignificant or less 
significant and the intrinsic quality of the asset more critical. Another important function 
of securitization is that it adds another channel to the money cycle of a nation's economy, 
thereby improving liquidity in the market and diversifying risk. A traditional bank has 
to depend on various sources of funds to originate loans. However, by securitization, a 
traditional bank is not only doing away with the function of funding, but also transfer- 
ring the risk on loans to its investors. 
Securitization of commercial loans was born out of the severe devaluation of com- 
mercial property values in the early 1990s, when the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), 
created by Congress to facilitate the bailout of the ailing thrift industry, monetized its 
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investment by issuing nearly $15 billion mixed-property commercial mortgage-backed 
securities. 
The CMBS Structure 
The basic building block of the CMBS transaction is a commercial loan obtained by 
the borrowers from a local or regional bank (the originator bank) to either finance a com- 
mercial purchase or to refinance a prior mortgage obligation. Many commercial loans 
backing CMBS transactions are balloon loans, which require substantial principal pay- 
ment on the final maturity date. The CMBS structure takes shape when the originator 
bank holds one or more loans and sells it to an accumulator bank. The accumulator bank 
collects loans from one or more originator banks, structures the accumulated mortgage 
portfolios, and transfers them to a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) or a special-purpose 
entity (SPE). This transfer of assets must be a "bankruptcy remote transfer," which means 
that even if the originator/ accumulator bank were to go bankrupt or get into other finan- 
cial difficulties, the rights of the investors to the assets held by the SPV are not affected. 
An SPV is created solely for the purpose of transaction, which holds the assets on behalf 
of the investors and issues to the investors its own securities. Therefore, an SPV acts only 
as a pass-through entity and does not maintain the credit risk on its own balance sheet. 
The SPV passes the mortgage loan documents to a trust, which is responsible for calculat- 
ing monthly bond payments to certificate holders and holding the mortgage loan docu- 
ments. Because the majority of SPVs are Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits 
(REMICs), we will focus only on this form of conduit. The REMIC is the most popular 
form of conduit, as it assures a single tax on investor return. That is, if the conduit meets 
REMIC qualifications, it will not be subject to federal income tax except on certain enu- 
merated transactions. Another important structural feature of CMBS transactions is the 
presence of both master and special sewicers. Master servicers function as the primary 
sewicers and maintain a large amount of information to facilitate the monthly collection 
of payments, adjustment of ARM (adjustable-rate mortgages) rates, remitting and report- 
ing to investors and trustees, etc. Special servicers handle delinquent loans and play an 
important role in the event of prepayment, while maximizing the recovery for investors. 
The rating agencies are private parties that evaluate the creditworthiness of the secu- 
rities. To facilitate marketing of the securities to investors, the mortgage pool is divided 
into pieces called "tranches," and different classes of securities are sold that correspond 
to the various tranches. Each tranche has different risk characteristics and, therefore, the 
investors in each tranche earn different interest rates. The highest-rated tranche in the 
pool typically carries a AAA rating and will earn the lowest interest rate, because the 
investors in this class of securities will be the last to experience any loss of principal or 
interest if defaults occur in the mortgage pool. The lowest-rated tranche, or "first-loss" 
piece, will earn a relatively higher interest rate, but its investors will be the first to lose 
their investment as a result of mortgage defaults. There also may be one or more inter- 
mediate tranches. The conduit lender (SPV) also retains a small portion of the interest 
payable by the borrower in the form of a bond called an interest-only (10) strip. When a 
mortgage interest rate exceeds the interest rate paid to the investors on the security 
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backed by the mortgage, the excess interest is "stripped" and sold as an I 0  strip. The con- 
duit lender's profit is usually generated by selling the I 0  strip and by cashing out this 
payment stream in return for a lump-sum amount. 
The entire management structure, involving the borrower, originator bank, accumu- 
lator bank, SPV, master servicer, special servicer, trust, and the investors, is established 
by a pooling and service agreement (PSA). This extensive document describes the duties 
governing each of the parties in the CMBS pool, the handling of loans, allocation of cash 
flows to different classes of investors, and clauses that protect the status of the SPV. The 
chart in Figure 1 illustrates a typical processing flow for securitization of a commercial 
loan. 
Prepayment 
A unique characteristic of commercial loans as collateral is the limitation on bor- 
rower prepayment. Unlike other asset classes, commercial loans may have extensive pro- 
visions that limit and penalize borrowers who want to prepay. In the residential mort- 
gage-backed securities (RMBS) market, the vast majority of mortgages have no 
prepayment penalties. In the CMBS market, the vast majority of mortgages have some 
form of prepayment penalty that can affect both the investors and the borrowers. The 
investors want to preserve their return on investment and look for a properly formulated 
prepayment penalty that would suffice to pay its anticipated return. On the other hand, 
the borrower wants to exercise the option of refinancing his or her mortgage when the 
interest rates in the market decline. Considering the varying interests, it is important for 
the borrower to have good knowledge about the type and procedure of prepayment 
when signing up for the mortgage loan. Based on the mortgage documents, two popular 
methods of prepayment are available to borrowers: yield maintenance and defeasance. 
Yield Maintenance. For many years, the life insurance industry has typically quoted a 
prepayment penalty using a yield maintenance method of calculation. This calculation 
protects the lender against a decline in interest rates. During a declining interest rate 
period, borrowers typically try to refinance their loans in order to improve their loan's 
interest rate, therefore paying off existing loans. Based on the original loan, term, and 
rate, a lender expects certain cash flows. If the loan pays off early in a lower interest rate 
period than when the loan was originally cast, the lender would lose this cash flow by 
being forced to reinvest the proceeds of the loan paid off in a lower yielding investment 
(loan). The lender needs a shield against this loss of yield and requires the borrower to 
compensate for the early payoff. This compensation is called yield maintenance. 
A yield maintenance penalty is generally established by multiplying the present 
value of the remaining payments by the difference between the coupon rate and the trea- 
sury securities yield with the same term as the remaining term of the loan. The difference 
between the coupon rate and the treasury securities yield is called the treasury rate dif- 
ferential. The idea is that the lender should be able to receive the same return as if the 
loan was in place to full maturity. 
Figure 1 Securitization process 
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Table 1 illustrates the example of a borrower who, after three years and one month 
and after the lock-out period is over, prepays the loan. The example assumes an original 
loan of $5,000,000 for a 10-year balloon term, with an amortization period of 30 years at a 
7.25% interest rate. 
Table 1 
Yield maintenance cost estimation 
1 Original Loan Balance 
Term (10 years/ 120 months) 120 
Amortization (30 years / 360 months) 360 
I Coupon 1 7.25% 
1 Balance Time Period (in years) I 6.92 I 
Note Dated 
I Maturity / Anticipated Repayment Date (ARD) 1 1/1/2009 I 
1/1/1999 
Estimated Prepayment Date 2/1/2002 --- 
I Interpolated 6.92 yr. T-Bill, as on February 1,2002' 1 4.6% 1 
Outstanding Principal Balance as on 2/1/2002 
Monthly Debt Service 
$4,838,822 
$34,109 
Yield Maintenance (YM)** 
I Total YM Cost I = $4,838,822 + $887,343 I 
= $4,838,822 x (7.25 - 4.6) x 6.92 , 
- - 
YM Penalty 
" Based on 5-year T-bill, 11 / 151 OGARD, on 21 1/02 (source: iYww.bloomberg.com) 
"" YM=Prepaid Principal x Treasurey Rate Differential x Balance Time Period 
= $ 887,343 
Based on this scenario, a borrower has to pay a penalty of $887,343, or 18.34%, on an 
outstanding principal balance of $4,838,822, for a total prepayment cost of $5,726,165. 
Ultimately, the external component that defines the yield maintenance cost is the 
treasury rate, which fluctuates depending on the economic environment. Considering 
the example in Table 1 and assuming that the mortgage was obtained at a fixed rate of 
7.25%, when the treasury rate drops below 4.676, the treasury rate differential will 
be higher, leading to a higher prepayment cost. Therefore, a borrower seeking to 
take advantage of an interest rate decline would pay a higher fee than the borrower who 
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prepays when interest rates have remained constant or have risen. On the other hand, if 
the treasury rate grows significantly above 4.6%, the treasury rate differential will 
become smaller, leading to a lower prepayment cost. Although the treasury rate differen- 
tial may decline, it will never reach zero, due to application of the spread related to risk 
and transaction cost. Therefore, regardless of how much the treasury rate may increase, 
the borrower has to pay a prepayment penalty. Since the market interest rate and the trea- 
sury rate are directly correlated and have a high correlation, good refinancing opportuni- 
ties for the borrower will be limited when the treasury rates are high. 
Defeasance. In simple terms, defeasance is the repayment of a securitized mortgage using 
treasury securities/ treasury bills (T-bills). Instead of passing the loan repayment and any 
penalty through to the investor, the borrower invests that cash in U.S. treasury securities 
(strips/bills) to fulfill the remaining cash flow structure of the loan. The treasury securi- 
ties replace the real estate as collateral for the loan so that the expected cash flows for that 
loan remain intact through maturity. Therefore, a loan obligation is not canceled once 
defeasance occurs; rather, the loan stays alive through to its maturity date, but the bor- 
rower effectively has paid upfront each payment due for the balance of the loan term. 
Under the REMIC rules, the earliest that defeasance may occur is after the second 
anniversary of the startup day of the REMIC, which is the first day that securitization in 
that REMIC is issued. This period-which contractually prohibits the borrower from all 
prepayments-is called the "lock-out period." The typical defeasance process for a secu- 
ritized loan, as explained by Litwa (2000) of GMACCM, is as follows 
1. The borrower delivers a defeasance request to the servicer at least 30 days prior 
to the target defeasance date. 
2. The sewicer determines the particular defeasance requirements from the loan 
documents and delivers instructions to the borrower that outline the defeasance 
steps and what the borrower must implement and what the servicer will do. The 
sewicer also sends along an estimate of the costs (other than the actual purchase 
price of the defeasance securities). The servicer also includes the proposed defea- 
sance collateral agreement and, if appropriate, an escrow agreement with respect 
to surplus proceeds from redeemed securities. 
3. The borrower gives its go-ahead after reviewing the defeasance requirements, 
hires its investment adviser to identify and purchase securities, and notifies the 
servicer of the investment adviser. 
4. The servicer sends a factual statement of relevant loan information (payment date, 
unpaid principal balance, and interest) to the investment adviser, along with cop- 
ies of relevant loan documents, and identifies the accounting firm that will pro- 
vide verification of the defeasance calculations. The servicer sends similar infor- 
mation to the accounting firm. (The accounting certification must run in favor of 
the loan servicer, along with the lender, since the loan servicer may have account- 
ability to the lender if it approves insufficient defeasance. The accounting certifica- 
tion also assists the rating agencies in their analysis for issuance of no-downgrade 
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letters. Consequently, the selected accounting firm must be acceptable to the ser- 
vicer and each of the rating agencies.) 
5. The investment adviser identifies the proposed defeasance securities, and a pre- 
liminary verification is obtained from the accounting firm. (The identification of 
the defeasance securities and preliminary accounting certification may be sub- 
mitted to the rating agencies to commence rating agency review. Rating agency 
approval would be qualified, however, on the identified defeasance securities 
actually being purchased and the final accounting certification containing no 
exceptions or material modifications from the preliminary draft.) Once the prelim- 
inary accounting verification is favorable, the investment adviser purchases the 
defeasance securities and delivers the list of purchased securities and copies of the 
trade confirmations to the accounting firm for the accounting firm to issue and 
deliver its final certification to the servicer. 
6. The investment adviser causes the purchased securities to be transferred to the 
custodian selected by the lender to hold the defeasance securities for the lender's 
benefit. The trades are effected by book entries. The custodian delivers trade con- 
firmations to the servicer. 
7. The borrower delivers the following to the servicer for review and approval: 
Legal opinions regarding enforceability, perfection, and REMIC non- 
disqualification. 
An officer certificate certifying compliance with all conditions to defeasance. 
Successor borrower documents, if applicable, including a fully executed loan 
assumption agreement between the borrower and the successor borrower, the 
organizational documents of the successor borrower, and a legal non-consoli- 
dation opinion and assumption enforceability opinion. 
Proposed forms of releases of the mortgage and related Uniform Commer- 
cial Code (UCC) financing statements. 
8. If required, the servicer submits its defeasance recommendation and all defea- 
sance materials to the rating agencies. This is done to obtain no-downgrade letters 
from each rating agency that rated the related commercial mortgage-backed secu- 
rities. The rating agencies currently estimate a two-week review period for a no- 
downgrade letter request in connection with defeasance. This time requirement 
must be factored into the borrower's defeasance target date, as the defeasance can- 
not be approved unless all required no-downgrade letters have been received. 
9. The servicer reviews and approves the adequacy of the materials returned by the 
borrower. If the defeasance conditions are satisfied, the servicer coordinates exe- 
cution and distribution of the defeasance closing documents. This would include 
the release of the mortgaged real estate and related UCC financing statements to 
the borrower and, if required under the service agreement, the delivery of a ser- 
vicer compliance letter to the lender (stating that all defeasance conditions have 
been satisfied). 
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10. It should be noted that part of the purpose of the review in connection with prepa- 
ration of the defeasance collateral agreement is to make certain that key loan terms 
that appear only in the mortgage / deed of trust and are intended to remain appli- 
cable to the defeased loan are not inadvertently released by the mortgage release. 
For instance, many times the mortgage1 deed of trust contains the SPE covenants. 
These would need to be either superseded by SPE requirements captured in the 
new defeasance collateral agreement or incorporated into it by reference. 
The flow of a typical defeasance process is illustrated in Figure 2. A number of par- 
ties are involved in the defeasance process; a list of important parties and their functions 
is shown in Figure 3. 
Defeasance can be a time-consuming process. According to Newman & Associates 
and Commercial Defeasance LLC., after the borrower gives a go-ahead signal for defea- 
sance, it may take 15 to 30 days to defease the loan, depending on the complexity of the 
structure and the type (partial or full) of defeasance. On the other hand, yield mainte- 
nance may take 7 to 14 days for the entire prepayment process. 
Like the yield maintenance penalty the defeasance penalty also varies with the trea- 
sury rate, but in defeasance, the T-bills that are fictitious in the yield maintenance 
formula are actually purchased, not by the lender, but instead by the borrower. In defea- 
sance also, the fluctuation in prepayment penalty due to treasury rate movement follows 
the same rules as those of the yield maintenance. That is, the prepayment cost will 
increase if the treasury rate differential increases due to lower treasury rates, and vice 
versa. But, unlike yield maintenance, the defeasance penalty can reach zero if treasury 
rates increase substantially and become equal to the coupon rate at which the mortgage 
was locked, as prepayment is made in terms of yield on T-bills only and there is 
no involvement of treasury rate differential. It should be noted that T-bills are non- 
amortizing obligations that pay interest semi-annually and conduit loans typically 
require monthly payments of interest and/or principal. Hence, an experienced broker/ 
dealer is required to select the right T-bills, which can also significantly reduce the secu- 
rity cost. Besides incurring defeasance penalty on purchase of T-bills, the borrower 
incurs transaction costs, which may vary based on the parties and the services required. 
Figure 2 Defeasance flow chart 
Servicer sends 
Servicer releases 
escrow balance to 
Figure 3 parties and their functions in the defeasance process 
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An estimate of the defeasance cost for the borrower on February 1, 2002, using 
the same assumptions as those in the yield maintenance prepayment cost, is shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 
Defeasance cost estimation 
1 Original Loan Balance 1 $5,000,000 1 
I Term (10 years/ 120 months) 1 120 1 
1 Amortization (30 years/ 360 months) 1 360 
- 
Coupon 
Note Dated 
I Estimated Defeasance Date 1 2/1/2002 
1 ~ a t u r i t ~ /  ~n t i c i~a ted  Repayment Date (ARD) 1 1/1/2009 
1 Outstanding Principal Balance as on 2/ 112002 1 $4,838,822 
1 Monthly Debt Service I $34,109 I 
1 Defeasance Penalty (%) 1 15.95% 1 
Security Cost (U.S. Treasury Strips) 
1 Transaction Cost* 1 $73,327 
$5,610,717 
Total Defeasance Cost 1 $5,684,044 
"Calculated from defeasance calculator available on www.defeasewithease.com 
Defeasance Penalty ($) 
The defeasance penalty is $771,895 or 15.95% of the outstanding principal balance of 
$4,838,822. The total defeasance prepayment cost of $5,684,044 is $42,121 less than the 
$5,726,165 total yield maintenance prepayment cost. It should be noted that the treasury 
rates were at a low of 4.6% during the time of this calculation; as discussed earlier, the 
prepayment costs may fluctuate based on the treasury rate. In the current example, the 
transaction cost of $73,327 was calculated after inputting the required loan terms on the 
defeasance calculator (www.defeasewithease.com) provided by Commercial Defeasance 
LLC. Table 3 provides the detail of the transaction cost calculation. 
$nl,sss 
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Table 3 
Transaction cost estimation 
Because of the complexity of structure and the elaborate procedure required to 
defease a loan, newly formed consulting firms offer complete defeasance services under 
one roof that can work in the best interests of .the borrower. Newman and Associates (a 
subsidiary of GMAC Holding Companies) and Commercial Defeasance LLC are consid- 
ered the pioneers in this direction. The commercial defeasance market is still growing, 
and as the rate of loan defeasance increases, more companies specializing in defeasance 
are expected to emerge, which will further streamline the defeasance process and reduce 
security and transaction costs. 
Ultimately, the borrower has two concerns-the prepayment cost and the prepay- 
ment process--on the basis of which he or she decides the prepayment method. The fol- 
lowing paragraphs provide an analysis of the penalty cost and the prepayment process 
for yield maintenance versus defeasance. 
Transaction Cost 
Rating Agency Fee 
Servicer Processing Fee 
Special Service Fee 
Custodian 
Servicer Legal 
Penalty Cost 
Maximum 
$ 20,000 
10,000 
2,500 
25,000 
25,000 
Minimum 
$ 0 
5,000 
0 
12,500 
1 5,000 
Unless there is a substantial decrease or increase in the treasury rate in comparison to 
the coupon rate, yield maintenance and defeasance will result in similar prepayment 
costs. As explained, the borrower may benefit through yield maintenance as well as 
defeasance if treasury rates increase substantially in comparison to the coupon rate, 
because the price of treasuries will fall, and the borrower will be able to set up a portfolio 
that mimics the original cash flows at a lower price than the amount that would have had 
to be repaid. But, compared to yield maintenance, defeasance has a higher potential of 
gain, depending on the rise in treasury rates. 
Estimated 
$ 5,000 
5,000 
0 
14,300 
15,000 
P 
Special NY Counsel 
Accountants Fee 
Prepayment Process 
Defeasance, compared to yield maintenance, is a more time-consuming process for 
borrowers and lenders. However, newly formed consulting firms can manage the entire 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
5,000 
Successor Borrower 3,500 
5,000 
5,000 
10,000 
19,027 
$121,527 
Commercial Defeasance 
Total Transaction Cost 
5,000 
19,027 
$ 73,327 
19,027 
$ 65,027 
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process on behalf of the borrower. After the prepayment, the property may be sold. How- 
ever, the borrowing entity continues to exist and could potentially affect the balance 
sheet and taxes. Also, because the securities need to be purchased and put into escrow 
before the property sells, the security broker may require a large deposit from the bor- 
rower. The defeasance process may take from 15 to 30 days, longer than the time required 
for yield maintenance (typically 7 to 14 days). 
Conclusion and Implications for Hospitality Finance 
Prepayments constitute a growing trend in the CMBS market. Due to complexities 
involved in the structure of CMBS loans, such prepayments present new challenges to 
borrowers and lenders, as well as some opportunities for potentially higher returns. Pre- 
payment is a complex process. Such a process requires advance planning on the part of 
borrowers who wish to refinance or sell their properties. Yield maintenance and defea- 
sance are two primary forms of prepayment methods. Defeasance is becoming a popular 
mode of prepayment. Compared to yield maintenance, it keeps investor's returns intact 
and incurs similar or less penalty for borrowers based on fluctuations in treasury rates. 
Such issues and the recent trend of increase in use suggest that defeasance, which is cur- 
rently a specialized service, will become more and more popular in the coming years. 
Commercial mortgage-backed securities have emerged strong and have faced a gen- 
erally positive credit environment since the last recession. As the market grew out of 
recession in the early 1990s, the primary focus remained on providing better and safer 
returns to investors. Tied in their lock box, a period that contractually prohibits the bor- 
rower from all prepayments, borrowers kept holding onto their loans. Currently as the 
delinquency rate on loans has been on the rise and as the mortgage market offers refi- 
nancing opportunities at lower interest rates, more and more borrowers are looking to 
transfer or to refinance their loans. It is expected that the detailed and practical insights 
provided in this paper will help borrowers better understand commercial mortgage- 
backed securities. Such an understanding, in turn, should make it easier for borrowers to 
find their way out of CMBS loans. 
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